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ABSTRACT
_________________________________________________________________________________
Forward exchange rate unbiassedness is rejected for international exchange markets. This paper proposes
a stochastic general equilibrium model which generates substantial variability in the magnitude of
predictable excess returns. Simulation exercises suggest that high persistency in the monetary policy
produces greater bias in the estimated slope coefficient in the regression of the change in the logarithm
of the spot exchange rate on the forward premium. Also, our model suggest that the nature of the
transmission between monetary shocks can explain the excess return puzzle. Empirical evidence for the
US-UK exchange rate according to our theoretical results is provided. 
_________________________________________________________________________________
RESUMEN
_________________________________________________________________________________
La insesgadez del tipo de cambio forward es rechazada para los mercados cambiarios internacionales.
Este trabajo propone un modelo de equilibrio general dinámico y estocástico que genera variabilidad
suficiente en las magnitudes de los excesos de rendimientos predecibles. Los ejercicios de simulación
realizados sugieren que una alta persistencia de la política monetaria produce un mayor sesgo en el
coeficiente estimado de la pendiente de la regresión entre la primera diferencia del logaritmo del tipo de
cambio spot sobre la prima forward. Además, nuestro modelo sugiere que la naturaleza de la transmisión
entre shocks monetarios puede explicar la paradoja del exceso de rendimiento. Por último,
proporcionamos evidencia empírica de acuerdo con nuestros resultados teóricos para el tipo de cambio
entre EEUU y Reino Unido.
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1 Introduction
The puzzle of biasedness on forward exchange rate refers that the estimated
slope coe¢cients in the regression of the change in the logarithm of the spot
rate on the forward premium signi…cantly departs from one (see Zhu (2002),
Tauchen (2001), Baillie and Bollerslev (2000), Baillie and Ostenberg (2000)
and McCallum (1994), among many others). Such discrepancy from the
underlying value in the uncovered interest rate parity implies that the forward
rate is not an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate, suggesting the
possibility of unexploited pro…t opportunities. Potential explanations of this
excess return puzzle generally are assigned to three kind of categories: a) the
most popular is that such pattern arises as a consequence of a time-varying
risk premia (see Fama (1984)); b) a second explanation relies on the nature
of expectations. Under no rational expectations agents do not e¢ciently use
the available information set, incurring in systematic forecasting errors over
a signi…cant number of time periods ahead (see Froot and Frankel (1989));
and c) the peso problem, that is, market participants anticipate by rational
learning process a future discrete shift in policy that is not performed within
the sample period analyzed (see Lewis, (1995)).
Even though a substantial number of studies have addressed the ability of
general equilibrium models related to the Lucas (1982) model to explain the
forward premium puzzle (see, for example, Hodrick (1989), Macklem (1991),
Canova and Marrinan (1993), Bekaert (1994)), they unsuccessfully explained
the substantial variability that occur in the magnitude of predictable excess
returns. Currently, there is no conclusive theory explaining the behavior of
the bias of test for a risk premium in forward exchange rates, and it is yet
regarded as one of the most important unresolved puzzle in international
…nance.
In this paper we develop a theoretical general equilibrium model to ex-
plain short and long-run risk premium in forward markets for foreign ex-
change that, not only provide additional insights about the potential ex-
plaining factors of the forward risk premium, but also reproduce the forward
premium anomaly under rational expectations. The model takes as bench-
mark the Dutton’s model (1993) which is based on the general equilibrium
models of Lucas (1982). Our model extend the …rst one in three ways: a)
we consider two forward (one and two periods) exchange rates as a hedge
instruments for spot exchange rate a more realistic approach to real mar-
kets in where di¤erent time to maturity can be traded. This enriches the
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analysis because of it would be possible to identify the e¤ect of the time
to maturity in the derivative contract on the forward market risk premia,
b) it is considered the possibility that domestic and foreign consumptions
goods will be complementary or substitutes. Therefore, the model allows to
estimate the impact of the nature of consumptions goods. If, for example,
dollars are relatively risk, the uncertainty about the future spot exchange
should a¤ect di¤erently on the forward risk premia under complementaries
or substitutes consumption goods, and c) the weight of each, domestic and
foreign, consumption good in the utility function is not necessary the same.
Consequently, a broad set of scenarios can be simulated in order to explore
for potential explanatory factors of the risk premium.
The solution of the model involves to evaluate expectations of nonlinear
expressions. Therefore, numerical solutions are provided. Under the assump-
tion of rational expectations, our solution method allows to solve jointly for
both prices and positions in one and two-periods ahead forward contracts.
This is an interesting extension relative to the Dutton‘s solution method.
Simulation exercises are carried out with a variety of parameter values,
revealing that, even when the econometric bias behind the regression of the
change in the logarithm of the spot rate on the forward premium is taken
into account, the model can reproduce the bias for forward exchange rate to
predict the future evolution of spot rate. The model suggest what are the
key factor generating high volatility for the risk premium is the persistence of
the monetary policy. Under a relative high persistence the estimated slopes
dramatically decreases below one. Moreover, theoretical results show that
the time to maturity of forward contract is negatively correlated with the
size of the slope coe¢cient in the regression, that is, the estimated slopes
corresponding to the long time to maturity contract are relatively lower.
In accordance with the theoretical simulations of the model, the paper
reports empirical evidence for the US dollar -British pound, not only on the
relationship between the correlation of the monetary shocks and the size
of estimated slopes, but also on the linkage between the persistence of the
monetary policy and the bias for forward exchange rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 present the model.
In section 3 simulations of risk premium are presented and theoretical results
about the bias of forward premium are provided. Section 4 refers empirical
evidence for the US-UK exchange rate. Finally, section 5 summarizes and
makes concluding remarks.
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2 The Model
There are two countries with its own currency and a single consumer. In each
country the representative …rm receives an endowment of a single traded
good. The only tradable …nancial assets are the money forward periods
exchange contracts. Also, there is no contingent claims markets, so all pos-
sibilities to reduce risk are concerning the forward exchange market, where
two maturity contracts are available.
The two consumers own titles to the …rms in their respective countries.
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows: 1) at the beginning
of each period, both …rms pay to the respective consumers in its country
a dividend equal to all incomes achieved the previous period. Then, the
consumer turns in its dividends for a new money, and the old money becomes
worthless. This implies that all money will be spent; 2) after receiving the
money supply, consumers liquidate their forward contracts traded in foreign
exchange in the two previous periods, 3) consumers spend their money on the
two goods. Domestic goods must be purchased with its own currency. All
transactions take place at equilibrium prices. 4) At the end of each period,
consumers make forward contracts to delivery of currency in the next two
periods.
Endowments of goods and money supplies are stochastic, and its natural
logarithm follow an autoregressive process with a Normal innovation. Let us
to denote Xt andMt for any good endowment or money supply, respectively:
lnXt = ¹X(1 ¡ ½X) + ½X lnXt¡1 + »X;t ; »X;t~N
³
0; ¾2X
´
, (1)
lnX ¤t = ¹X¤ (1¡ ½X¤ ) + ½X¤ lnX¤t¡1 + »¤X;t ; »X¤;t~N
³
0; ¾2X¤
´
, (2)
lnMt = ¹M(1¡ ½M) + ½M lnMt¡1 + »M;t ; »M;t~N
³
0; ¾2M
´
, (3)
lnM ¤t = ¹M¤(1 ¡ ½M¤) + ½M¤ lnM ¤t¡1 + »¤M;t ; »M¤;t~N
³
0; ¾2M¤
´
, (4)
where the asterisk denotes the foreign country. Correlations between any four
shocks (½MM¤; ½XX¤; ½MX ; ½MX¤; ½M¤X ; ½M¤X¤) are initially restricted to
be zero.
2.1 The Consumer’s problem
The utility function of the home consumer is a CES function:
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Ut =
1
1¡ ° [Á(CD;t)
² + (1¡ Á) (CF;t)²](1¡°)=² , (5)
where CD;t and CF;t are the consumption levels of domestic and foreign goods
at time t , ° is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, and 11¡² is the elas-
ticity of substitution, and Á is the weight for each consumption good. If ²
approaches to zero consumption goods becomes more substitutes, whereas
complementary arises when ² approaches to one. The parameter Á measures
the weight of each consumption good in the utility function. The optimiza-
tion problem for the home consumer is:
Max E0
" 1X
t=0
¯t
1
1 ¡ ° [Á (CD;t)
² + (1 ¡ Á) (CF;t)²](1¡°)=²
#
(6)
fCD;t ; CF;tg
s:t:
PD;tCD;t +StPF;tCF;t · Yt ,
Yt = Mt + Tt¡1;1
St ¡ Ft¡1;1
Ft¡1;1
+ Tt¡2;2
St ¡ Ft¡2;2
Ft¡2;2
,
where PD;t and PF;t are the prices of domestic and foreign goods at time t,
Yt is the total income in period t, St is the spot exchange rate, Ft¡1;1, Ft¡2;2
are the prices for the two maturity forward contracts available, Tt¡1;1 and
Tt¡2;2 are the respective amount of its currency that the home country sold
forward in the two previous periods. The money supply (Mt) plus the pro…ts
on each forward currency trading in period t equals the total home income.
A similar optimization problem can be pointed out for the foreign consumer,
that is:
Max E0
" 1X
t=0
¯t
1
1¡ °
h
Á
³
C ¤D;t
´²
+ (1 ¡ Á)
³
C¤F;t
´²i(1¡°)=²#
(7)
fC¤D;t ; C¤F;tg
s:t:
PD;tC
¤
D;t + StPF;tC
¤
F;t · Y ¤t St ,
Y ¤t =M
¤
t + T
¤
t¡1;1
St ¡ Ft¡1;1
Ft¡1;1St
+ T ¤t¡2;2
St ¡ Ft¡2;2
Ft¡2;2St
.
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2.1.1 Optimal good choices.
In any period t the home consumer chooses levels of CD;t and CF;t that
maximize Ut subject to the level of total home income. First order conditions
for choice of CD;t and CF;t are:
[Á (CD;t)
² + (1¡ Á) (CF;t)²]
1¡°
² ¡1 (CD;t)
²¡1¡ ¸tPD;t = 0 , (8)
[Á (CD;t)
² + (1¡ Á) (CF;t)²]
1¡°
² ¡1 (CF;t)
²¡1 ¡ ¸tStPF;t = 0 , (9)
Yt ¡ PD;tCD;t ¡ PF;tStCF;t = 0 . (10)
From 8 and 9 yields the following relationships:
CF;t =
"
(1 ¡ Á)PD;t
ÁPF;tSt
#¾
CD;t , (11)
where ¾ = 11¡² is the elasticity of substitution. Using 11 and the budget
constraint, the demand function for the domestic good is the following:
CD;t =
YtP
¡¾
D;t
P 1¡¾D;t +
³
1¡Á
Á
´¾
(StPF;t)
1¡¾ . (12)
Substituting 12 into equation 11 the next demand function for the foreign
good arises:
CF;t =
"
(1¡ Á)PD;t
ÁPF;tSt
#¾ YtP¡¾D;t
P 1¡¾D;t +
³
1¡Á
Á
´¾
(StPF;t)
1¡¾ (13)
Similar equation to (12) and (13) can be easily found for the foreign country:
C¤F;t =
"
(1¡ Á)PD;t
ÁPF;tSt
#¾
C¤D;t (14)
C¤D;t =
Y ¤t StP
¡¾
D;t
P 1¡¾D;t +
³
1¡Á
Á
´¾
(StPF;t)
1¡¾ (15)
Substituting 15 into 14 we obtain the analytical expression for C ¤F;t.
6
2.1.2 Forward Contracting
As well as the allocation of current resources between the two goods, the
home consumer choose in period t the levels of the one and two periods
forward contracting, that is Tt;1 and Tt;2. The Euler conditions are:
Et
"
¸t+1¯
t+1
Ã
St+1 ¡ Ft;1
Ft;1
!#
= 0 , (16)
Et
"
¸t+2¯
t+2
Ã
St+2 ¡ Ft;2
Ft;2
!#
= 0 , (17)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation to the information set available
in period t. From 16:
Et [¸t+1St+1] = Et [¸t+1Ft;1] ,
and taking into account 8 yields:
Ft;1 =
Et
h
@Ut+1
@CF;t+1
1
PF;t+1
i
Et
h
@Ut+1
@CF;t+1
1
PF;t+1St+1
i . (18)
Similar rearranging from 17 when taking into account 8 leads to the following
expression for the two-periods forward price:
Ft;2 =
Et
h
@Ut+2
@CF;t+2
1
PF;t+2
i
Et
h
@Ut+2
@CF;t+2
1
PF;t+2St+2
i . (19)
Analogous expressions to (18) and (19) can be obtained when the foreign
consumer chooses in period t the levels of the one and two periods forward
contracting, that is T ¤t;1 and T ¤t;2:
Ft;1 =
Et
·
@U¤t+1
@C¤F;t+1
1
PF;t+1
¸
Et
·
@U¤t+1
@C¤F;t+1
1
PF;t+1St+1
¸ , (20)
Ft;2 =
Et
·
@U¤t+2
@C¤F;t+2
1
PF;t+2
¸
Et
·
@U¤t+2
@C¤F;t+2
1
PF;t+2St+2
¸ . (21)
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2.2 Market-Clearing
2.2.1 Equilibrium in the Goods Market.
The world constraints on consumptions of the two traded goods in both
countries implies that the total endowment of the two goods must be equal
the consumption of each good in the respective countries, that is:
CD;t +C
¤
D;t = XD;t , (22)
CF;t +C
¤
F;t = XF;t . (23)
Equilibrium prices of the two goods depend on the home and foreign money
supplies as well as their total endowment in each country. Taking into account
that a) money is worthless after each period and b) each country’s good only
can be purchased with the country’s currency, the following cash-in-advance
spending constraints must be hold:
PD;tXD;t = Mt , (24)
PF;tXF;t =M
¤
t . (25)
Since goods endowments XD;t and XF;t, and money supplies Mt and M ¤t are
exogenous, the two above equations determine prices of consumption goods.
The solution of the model requires the evaluation of expectations in equa-
tions 18 and 19, in where highly non-linear expressions appear. This avoids
the possibility of an analytical solution. Appendix 1 provides detailed expla-
nation about the solution method to obtain simulated equilibrium in spot
and forward exchange markets. It allows the joint search of all variables
(prices and positions) concerning the forward market. In equilibrium, the
following relationships between home and foreign derivative positions holds
Tt¡l;l = ¡T ¤t¡l;l , l = 1; 2. (26)
3 Simulation of forward prices and risk pre-
miums
The equilibrium spot rates can be obtained as follows: using the budget
constraints, PD;t CD;t+St PF;t CF;t = Yt and PD;t C¤D;t+St PF;t C¤F;t = Y ¤t St
8
and equations (11) and (14), we can solve analytically the spot exchange as
a function of the exogenous stochastic variables XD;t ; XF;t ;Mt ;M ¤t :
St =
1¡ Á
Á
Ã
XF;t
XD;t
!"
Mt
M¤t
. (27)
3.1 De…nition of Risk Premium
To avoid the implications of Siegel’s paradox we use the following de…nition
of the risk premium in the forward market:
rpt;t+l = ft;l ¡ Et (st+l) , l = 1; 2. (28)
where Et (¢) denotes the mathematical expectation conditioned on the set of
all relevant information at time t, st is the logarithm of the domestic currency
price of foreign currency at time t and ft;l is the logarithm of the forward
exchange rate with delivery at time t+ l.
3.2 Parameter scenarios where the forward premium
anomaly arises
3.2.1 Testing the unbiasedness hypothesis
The main objective of the paper is to analyze the parameter set that could
reproduce the forward premium bias. The central hypothesis that we analyze
in this paper is the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) condition, which
states that:
Et(¢st+l) = ft;l ¡ st = it ¡ i¤t ; (29)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation to the information set available
on time t; it and i¤t are the interest rates on domestic and foreign deposits,
respectively, and ¢ denotes the …rst di¤erence operator, that is, ¢st+l ´
st+l ¡ st+l¡1.
To test for unbiasedness hypothesis, the literature has widely focused on
the following regression relating the change in the spot rate to the forward-
spot spread:
¢st+l = ®l+ ¯ l(ft;l ¡ st) + ut+l;l ; (30)
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The estimation of equation (30) tries to test the ability of the forward-
spot di¤erential to forecast the direction of change in spot rate. Regardless
the sampling frequency, the UIP condition implies that ®l = 0 and ¯l = 1.
However, empirical evidence has widely reported on estimated slopes that
turn out to be below than one or even negatives1. This …nding not only
reject the UIP condition, but also is contradictory with either form of the
expectations hypothesis.
The analytical expression for the OLS estimation of ¯l is:
¯ols =
Cov (ft;l ¡ st; st+l ¡ st)
V ar (ft;l ¡ st) , (31)
where V ar (¢) refers to variance, and Cov (¢) denotes the covariance. As
pointed out in Engel (1996), if the estimator is consistent, under rational
expectations it follows that:
p lim
³
¯ols
´
= 1¡ ¯rp (32)
where ¯rp =
Cov(Et(st+l)¡st ; ft;l¡Et(st+l))+V ar(ft;l¡Et(st+l))
V ar(ft;l¡st) . From this expression
it can be observed that low values of ¯ols can be explained under rational
expectations if V ar (ft;l ¡ Et (st+l)) is enough large. The risk premium is
widely considered the most likely source of the puzzle, but taking into account
the regression results reported in the literature the required volatility are far
larger than most researchers would accept. One of the major task in the
literature concerns to explain why the risk premium has such a large variance.
Our model provide some insights about this issue.
3.2.2 Theoretical Results
In all numerical simulations the discount factor ¯ and the relative risk aver-
sion ° are constant and equal to 0:99 and 1:50, respectively2. We consider
a variety of scenarios than can be summarized as follows: a) we focus the
analysis on the e¤ects of the monetary policy (we leave further work the
analysis of the e¤ects of real shocks on risk premia in forward markets for
1A recent survey can be found in Engel (1996).
2Parameter values inside the interval [0:90; 0:99] and [1:10; 5:00] for ¯ and ° , lead to
similar results to those reported in the paper.
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foreign exchange). Therefore, only a uncertainty source is considered: mone-
tary shocks. This way we consider either one or two shocks; b) we distinguish
between situations in where there is no persistence in the shocks of both coun-
tries from other ones in where only the home country have persistence in the
monetary shock3. The nature of the interaction between monetary policies is
also examined. When two shocks are considered we allow for three possibili-
ties: uncorrelated, positive and negatively correlated monetary shocks. The
considered absolute value for the correlation coe¢cient between domestic and
foreign shocks is 0.9. To summarize the theoretical results from estimating
equation 30 using simulated spot and forward exchange rates with " = 14 ,
Table 1 reports the volatility of the forward premium and Figures 1 to 10
(Appendix 3) depict the estimated slopes as a function of the correlation be-
tween monetary shock and the persistence of the monetary policy when only
a monetary shock is considered. Also we provide the con…dence intervals at
the 5% signi…cance level based on the simulated distribution of slopes with
one hundred of theoretical observations. Several interesting questions emerge
from this information set:
1. The estimated slopes are generally lower than one, a consistent …nding
with expression 30. This means that ¯rp > 0. This …nding has been
documented in many empirical studies (see, for example, Bilson (1981),
Fama (1984), Bekaert and Hodrick (1993), Backus et al. (1993) and
Mark et al. (1993)).
2. There is a negative relationship between the estimated slope coe¢cient
and the time to maturity. In the long-run the forward bias is greater
than in short-run, re‡ecting a higher uncertainty in the futures evolu-
tion of spot rates,
3. A relative higher persistence in the monetary policy produces lower
estimated value for the slope. This …nding is consistent with those
reported in Baillie and Bollerslev (2000). Those authors simulate for-
ward premiums. according to a highly stylized UIP-FIGARCH model
(Fractionally Integrated GARCH model), showing that a long memory
3Under no correlation between monetary shocks this situation can be interpreted as
the home country behaves as a leader since it can update the forecasting of money supply.
The considered autoregressive parameter is 0.9.
4Similar results are found with " = 0, which are available from the authors upon
request.
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in the forward premium produces wide dispersion in the slope coe¢-
cients. Tauchen (2001) simulates the sampling distribution of the slope
coe¢cient in equation (30), showing that such to be the case when
spot rates are generated with a near to non-stationary AR(1) process.
This is not surprising when equation (27) is observed. Under high
persistence in the monetary policy of the domestic country, spot rate
is very autocorrelated, and consequently the forward premium should
have high persistence. The negative relationship is clearer when.
4. More interestingly, our model suggest that under a relative high per-
sistence in the domestic/foreign monetary policy the volatility of the
forward premium is greater. From table 1, it can be observed that the
volatility under persistence is above …ve times the volatility that corre-
sponds to the case where monetary policy forecast can not be updated
using current information.
5. Also, the transmission of the monetary policy e¤ects between both
countries appears to be a signi…cant factor to explain departures from
the UIP. Under a relative high persistence, the estimated slope show
higher discrepancy with the unitary value when monetary shocks are
positively correlated. Indeed the maximum median anomaly for all
simulations appears when shocks are positively correlated and the do-
mestic monetary policy is very persistent. This a realistic scenario for
most of empirical studies that analyses the exchange rate between US
and other country, which generally takes as a benchmark the Fed´s
monetary policy. Deviations from the UIP condition are negligible re-
gardless the correlation between the monetary shocks only under no
persistence in the monetary policy of both countries.
But, what about the ability of the model to generate bias for forward
exchange rate?. To answer this question Figures 11 to 20 depict the sum of
the asymptotic bias plus the median estimated slopes coe¢cients and their
corresponding con…dence intervals at the 5% signi…cance level, again using
one hundred of theoretical observations. Those graphs show two relevant
aspects:
1. once we have …ltered the econometric bias a discrepancy with the uni-
tary value remains, revealing that the theoretical model can generate
a bias for forward exchange rate.
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2. the relative persistence in the monetary policy appears as the key fac-
tors behind the forward unbiasedness. It can be observed that the con-
…dence intervals are larger enough under a relative high persistence,
suggesting a higher variability in the potential estimated slopes. In
particular, when the two countries apply persistence in the monetary
policy the con…dence intervals are much less informative. Moreover,
under such scenario the correlation between monetary shocks is an ad-
ditional factor that explain the forward bias, revealing a higher median
deviation from one when shocks are positively rather than negatively
correlated (see Figures 19 and 20). Also in this case the con…dence
intervals are less informative than under no
In summary, our model suggest that the anomaly should appear when
one country act as a leader when monetary policy is implemented and a high
persistence is applied. Such is the case in most of empirical analysis that
concerns the dollar exchange rate. In the next section we provide empirical
evidence about this.
4 Empirical evidence. The US dollar-British
pound exchage rate
In this section we provide empirical evidence focusing not only on the rela-
tionship between the transmission of monetary shocks and slope coe¢cients,
but also on the link between the monetary persistence and the bias for the
US dollar-British puund forward exchange rate. The considered time to ma-
turity is one month and the sample period covers from December, 1986 to
November 2001.
The model predict a negative relationship between the estimated slopes
and the correlation between monetary shocks. Figure 21 show the XY plot
of the rolling correlation between the M1 cyclical components5 of US and
UK and the rolling slopes using one month time to maturity US-UK forward
exchange rate for the already referred sample period. The window size to
compute the rolling statistics corresponds to …ve years. The US average
rolling persistence in this period was 0.77. Clearly, and according with our
theoretical results, a negative relationship arises. To quantitative account for
this statement, we perform the following regression:
5The Hodrick-Prescott …lter is used to detrend the monetary aggregate.
13
¯t = ±0 + ±1½MM¤;t + ul;t l = 1; 2 (33)
where ¯t denotes the actual rolling slope and ½MM¤;t is the correlation co-
e¢cient between the cyclical M1 components. The …tted line is: ^¯ l;t =
0:88 (0:09)¡2:39 (0:21) ½MM¤;t where standard errors are in parentheses. The
R-squared becomes 0.42.
Also, the model suggests a negative relationship between the estimated
slopes coe¢cients and the persistence of the monetary policy. Figure 22 de-
pict the rolling persistence of the UK monetary policy and the corresponding
rolling slopes using a …ve years moving window over the above referred sam-
ple. It can be observed that in three subsamples a negative relationship
appears, suggesting that additional factors are a¤ecting the forward bias
along the overall sample.
5 Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper we examine the bias of tests for a risk premium in forward ex-
change rates which refers to signi…cant discrepancies with the unitary value
in the estimated slope coe¢cients from regressions of the change in the log-
arithm of the spot rate on the forward premium. We perform a theoretical
analysis by extending the dynamic and stochastic general equilibrium model
with goods endowment proposed in Dutton (1993). Our contribution is the
introduction of a two-period forward contract in the derivative market. Also,
a solution method under rational expectations is provided.
Our main objective is to explore the e¤ects of the monetary policy and
their interactions between the domestic and foreign country on the behavior
of the risk premium in order to explain the inconsistency with the UIP condi-
tion. Our simulations results suggest that a high persistence in the domestic
monetary policy produces greater volatility in the forward premium, and
consequently the estimated slope coe¢cients show greater deviations from
one. Moreover, the nature of the transmission between monetary shocks is a
potential explaining factor for excess return puzzle. Under persistence, the
estimated slopes dramatically decrease below one when monetary shocks are
positively correlated. Finally, we …nd that the time to maturity of the deriv-
ative contract is positively related with the bias of risk premium in forward
exchange rates. The UIP condition only holds in the absence of persistence
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when monetary shocks are uncorrelated. or negatively correlated. However,
this is an unlikely scenario for most of developed economies.
The paper provides empirical evidence for the US dollar-British pound
exchange rate. In accordance with our theoretical results, a negative relation-
ship between the forward bias and the UK monetary persistence is observed
along three di¤erent subsamples from December, 1986 to November 2001.
Moreover, a negative relationship between the forward bias and the correla-
tion between monetary shocks arises during the overall sample, where a high
persistence in the US monetary policy is detected.
While the focus of this paper is the e¤ect of the monetary policy, a similar
analysis can be made taking into account the presence of both monetary and
real shocks. We leave further work under such scenarios for further research.
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Appendix 1. Solution Method
This appendix contains the step that we use in the solution method. As
we pointed out in Section 3, the problem concerning the home and foreign
consumer is highly non-linear, not allowing to achieve an analytical solution.
Therefore a numerical approach must be used.
After providing numerical values for the structural parameters involved
in the theoretical economy, that is, f¯; °; Á; "; ¾X ; ¾X¤; ¾M ; ¾M¤; ¹X ; ¹X¤ ;
¹M ; ¹M¤; ½X ; ½X¤ ; ½M ; ½M¤g, the next stages are:
1. We obtain one hundred realizations for the stochastic variables XD;t;
XF;t; Mt; M ¤t in each time period t = 1; :::100.
2. One hundred realizations of both home and foreign prices of the con-
sumption goods are computed according to equations (24) and (25), in
each time period. Let us to denote this numerical set as f(PD;t;i;PF;t;i);
i; t = 1; :::100g, where i and t denote the realization and the time pe-
riod, respectively.
3. Similar numerical set to the previous one for PD and PF is computed for
the spot exchange rate using equation (27), that is, fSt;i i; t = 1; :::100g.
Computation of the forward prices and derivative positions for the one and
two period ahead traded contracts [Ft;1; Ft;2; Tt;1Tt;2]. From equations (11)
and (14), substituting into equations (18) and (19) the following expressions
can be obtained:
Ft;1 =
Et
"
C "¡1D;t+1
³
ÁC "D;t+1 + (1¡ Á)C"F;t+1
´ 1¡°
" ¡1 1
PD;t+1
#
Et
"
C"¡1D;t+1
³
ÁC "D;t+1 + (1¡ Á)C "F;t+1
´ 1¡°
" ¡1 1
PD;t+1St+1
#
=
Et [WD;t+1]
Et [WD;t+1=St+1]
, (34)
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Ft;2 =
Et
"
C "¡1D;t+2
³
ÁC "D;t+2 + (1¡ Á)C"F;t+2
´ 1¡°
" ¡1 1
PD;t+2
#
Et
"
C"¡1D;t+2
³
ÁC "D;t+2 + (1¡ Á)C "F;t+2
´ 1¡°
"
¡1
1
PD;t+2St+2
#
=
Et [WD;t+2]
Et [WD;t+2=St+2]
, (35)
Ft;1 =
Et
"
C¤ "¡1F;t+1
³
ÁC ¤ "D;t+1 + (1¡ Á)C ¤ "F;t+1
´ 1¡°
" ¡1 1
PF;t+1
#
Et
"
C¤ "¡1F;t+1
³
ÁC¤ "D;t+1 + (1¡ Á)C¤ "F;t+1
´1¡°
" ¡1 1
PF;t+1St+1
#
=
Et [WF;t+1]
Et [WF;t+1=St+1]
, (36)
Ft;2 =
Et
"
C¤ "¡1F;t+2
³
ÁC ¤ "D;t+2 + (1¡ Á)C ¤ "F;t+2
´ 1¡°
" ¡1 1
PF;t+2
#
Et
"
C¤ "¡1F;t+2
³
ÁC¤ "D;t+2 + (1¡ Á)C¤ "F;t+2
´1¡°
" ¡1 1
PF;t+2St+2
#
=
Et [WF;t+2]
Et [WF;t+2=St+2]
. (37)
We solve jointly Ft;1, Ft;2, Tt;1 and Tt;2 by searching values that satisfy the
following approximations of the equations (34) to (37):
Ft;1 =
PN
i=1
"
C"¡1D;t+1;i
³
ÁC"D;t+1;i + (1¡ Á)C"F;t+1;i
´1¡°
" ¡1 1
PD;t+1;i
#
PN
i=1
"
C"¡1D;t+1;i
³
ÁC"D;t+1;i + (1 ¡ Á)C"F;t+1;i
´1¡°
" ¡1 1
PD;t+1;i St+1;i
#
=
PN
i=1 [WD;t+1]PN
i=1 [WD;t+1=St+1]
, (38)
Ft;2 =
PN
i=1
"
C "¡1D;t+2;i
³
ÁC "D;t+2 + (1¡ Á)C "F;t+2;i
´ 1¡°
" ¡1 1
PD;t+2;i
#
PN
i=1
"
C"¡1D;t+2;i
³
ÁC"D;t+2;i + (1¡ Á)C"F;t+2;i
´ 1¡°
" ¡1 1
PD;t+2;iSt+2;i
#
=
PN
i=1 [WD;t+2;i]PN
i=1 [WD;t+2;i=St+2;i]
, (39)
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Ft;1 =
PN
i=1
"
C ¤ "¡1F;t+1;i
³
ÁC¤ "D;t+1;i + (1 ¡ Á)C¤ "F;t+1
´1¡°
" ¡1 1
PF;t+1;i
#
PN
i=1
"
C¤ "¡1F;t+1;i
³
ÁC ¤ "D;t+1;i + (1¡ Á)C ¤ "F;t+1;i
´ 1¡°
"
¡1
1
PF;t+1;iSt+1;i
#
=
PN
i=1 [WF;t+1;i]PN
i=1 [WF;t+1;i=St+1;i]
, (40)
Ft;2 =
PN
i=1
"
C¤ "¡1F;t+2;i
³
ÁC¤ "D;t+2;i + (1¡ Á)C¤ "F;t+2;i
´ 1¡°
" ¡1 1
PF;t+2;i
#
PN
i=1
"
C¤ "¡1F;t+2;i
³
ÁC ¤ "D;t+2;i + (1¡ Á)C ¤ "F;t+2;i
´ 1¡°
"
¡1
1
PF;t+2;iSt+2;i
#
=
PN
i=1 [WF;t+2;i]PN
i=1 [WF;t+2;i=St+2;i]
. (41)
Taking into account that under rational expectations Et [Wt+1] = ª1 at +
Et¡1 [Wt+1], where at is a white noise, the expression of the two period for-
ward price in t¡ 1 is:
Ft¡1;2 =
PN
i=1 [WD;t+1;i]¡ªD;1
³
WD;t ¡ PNi=1 [WD;t;i]´PN
i=1 [WD;t+1;i=St+1;i]¡ ~ªD;1
³
WD;t=St ¡ PNi=1 [WD;t;i=St;i]´ , (42)
or equivalently for the foreign consumer:
Ft¡1;2 =
PN
i=1 [WF;t+1;i]¡ªF;1
³
WF;t ¡ PNi=1 [WF;t;i]´PN
i=1 [WF;t+1;i=St+1;i]¡ ~ªF;1
³
WF;t=St ¡ PNi=1 [WF;t;i=St;i]´ . (43)
Next, we proceed as follows:
i)We posit initial conditions for the parameters {ª(0)D;1~ª
(0)
D;1ª
(0)
F;1
~ª
(0)
F;1}.
ii) Also, we need an initial vector. Let us to denote it by fF0;1; F¡1;2; T0;1;
T¡1;1g. Then, one hundred realizations of CD;1;i; CF;1;i; C¤D;1;i; C ¤F;1;i; Y1;i; Y ¤1;i
in t = 1 trough equations (11), (14) and the following expressions:
Y1;i = M1;i + T0;1
Ã
S1;i ¡ F0;1
F0;1
!
+ T¡1;2
Ã
S1;i ¡F¡1;2
F¡1;2
!
;
Y ¤1;i = M
¤
1;i ¡ T0;1
Ã
S1;i ¡ F0;1
F0;1S1;i
!
¡ T¡1;2
Ã
S1;i ¡ F¡1;2
F¡1;2S1;i
!
;
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CD;1;i =
Y1;i P
¡¾
D;1;i
P ¡¾D;1;i +
³
1¡Á
Á
´¾
(S1;iPF;1;i)
1¡¾
C¤D;1;i =
Y ¤1;iS1;i P
¡¾
F;1;i
P ¡¾D;1;i +
³
1¡Á
Á
´¾
(S1;iPF;1;i)
1¡¾
iii ) With the previous data set, fCD;1;i; CF;1;i; C¤D;1;i; C ¤F;1;i; Y1;i; Y ¤1;ig100i=1, we
iterate using the Gauss-Newton algorithm in the system concerning equa-
tions (38), (39), (42) and (43). After achieving the …xed point in the space
(F1;1; F0;2; T1;1; T0;2) and evaluating in t = 1 with the variables fF1;1; F0;2;
T1;1; T0;2g the corresponding expressions, it is possible to compute values for
CD;1; CF;1; C
¤
D;1; C
¤
F;1; Y1; Y
¤
1 , independently of the realization values.
iv) The steps ii) and iii) are repeated recursively for each time period, al-
lowing to obtain the numerical solutions for the remainder of the sample size,
that is, fCD;t; CF;t; C ¤D;t; C¤F;t; Yt; Y ¤t g100t=2: However, this solution depends on
the initial condition {ª(0)D;1 ~ª
(0)
D;1ª
(0)
F;1
~ª(0)F;1}. To …lter this e¤ect, we estimate an
autoregressive process for the expressions ofWD;t; (WD;t=St); WF;t; (WF;t=St)
that can be computed with the simulated series of the previous solution. We
use …ve lags in the AR speci…cation, a robust structure in order to forecast
the previous expressions. With the …tted autoregressive processes, estimation
of ª
0s are recovered to evaluate the discrepancy with (ª(0)D;1; ~ª
(0)
D;1;ª
(0)
F;1; ~ª
(0)
F;1)
using the euclidean norm. The used convergence criterion is 10¡6: When
the norm is lower, {CD;t; CF;t; C¤D;t; C¤F;t; Yt; Y ¤t }100t=1 is the …nal numerical
solution, whereas the norm is higher we back to step i) to iterate with the
new initial condition for the vector fª(0)D;1~ª(0)D;1ª(0)F;1~ª(0)F;1g.
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Appendix 2. Statistical Tables.
Table 1. Risk premium volatility
¾2M = 0:005; ½M = ½M¤ = ½X = ½X¤ = 0; ¾
2
M¤ = ¾
2
X = ¾
2
X¤ = 0
regression with l =1 regression with l =2
Á =0.9 Á =0.1 Á =0.9 Á =0.1
[V ar (ft;l ¡ E (st+l))]
1
2 0.0017 0.0017 0.0012 0.0012
¾2M = 0:005; ½M = 0:9; ½M¤ = ½X = ½X¤ = 0; ¾
2
M¤ = ¾
2
X = ¾
2
X¤ = 0
regression with l =1 regression with l =2
Á =0.9 Á =0.1 Á =0.9 Á =0.1
[V ar (ft;l ¡ E (st+l))]
1
2 0.0092 0.0092 0.0168 0.0169
¾2M = ¾
2
M¤ = 0:005; ½MM¤ = 0; ½M = ½M¤ = ½X = ½X¤ = 0; ¾
2
X = ¾
2
X¤ = 0
regression with l =1 regression with l =2
Á =0.9 Á =0.1 Á =0.9 Á =0.1
[V ar (ft;l ¡ E (st+l))]
1
2 0.0019 0.0019 0.0023 0.0022
¾2M = ¾
2
M¤ = 0:005; ½MM¤ = 0:9; ½M = ½M¤ = ½X = ½X¤ = 0; ¾
2
X = ¾
2
X¤ = 0
regression with l =1 regression with l =2
Á =0.9 Á =0.1 Á =0.9 Á =0.1
[V ar (ft;l ¡ E (st+l))]
1
2 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006
¾2M = ¾
2
M¤ = 0:005; ½MM¤ = ¡0:9; ½M = ½M¤ = ½X = ½X¤ = 0; ¾2X = ¾2X¤ = 0
regression with l =1 regression with l =2
Á =0.9 Á =0.1 Á =0.9 Á =0.1
[V ar (ft;l ¡ E (st+l))]
1
2 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020
¾2M = ¾
2
M¤ = 0:005; ½MM¤ = 0; ½M = 0:9; ½M¤ = ½X = ½X¤ = 0; ¾
2
X = ¾
2
X¤ = 0
regression with l =1 regression with l =2
Á =0.9 Á =0.1 Á =0.9 Á =0.1
[V ar (ft;l ¡ E (st+l))]
1
2 0.0074 0.0074 0.0153 0.0154
¾2M = ¾
2
M¤ = 0:005; ½MM¤ = 0:9; ½M = 0:9; ½M¤ = ½X = ½X¤ = 0; ¾
2
X = ¾
2
X¤ = 0
regression with l =1 regression with l =2
Á =0.9 Á =0.1 Á =0.9 Á =0.1
[V ar (ft;l ¡ E (st+l))]
1
2 0.0094 0.0094 0.0187 0.0188
¾2M = ¾
2
M¤ = 0:005; ½MM¤ = ¡0:9; ½M = 0:9; ½M¤ = ½X = ½X¤ = 0; ¾2X = ¾2X¤ = 0
regression with l =1 regression with l =2
Á =0.9 Á =0.1 Á =0.9 Á =0.1
[V ar (ft;l ¡ E (st+l))]
1
2 0.0070 0.0069 0.0127 0.0109
Note: Á measures the degree of substitutability or complementary.
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Median estimated slopes 
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Median estimated slopes
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Median estimated slopes
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Dashed lines are the bands for the 95% confidence interval 
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Median estimated slopes
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias
 One-period ahead forward premium
Two monetary shocks. No persistency in the foreign country
Dashed lines are the bands for the 95% confidence interval 
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias 
Two-periods ahead forward premium
Two monetary shocks. No persistency in the foreign country 
Dashed lines are the bands for the 95% confidence interval 
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias
 One-period ahead forward premium
Two monetary shocks. High persist. in the foreign country
Dashed lines are the bands for the 95% confidence interval
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias
 Two-periods ahead forward premium
Two monetary shocks. High persist. in the foreign country
Dashed lines are the bands for the 95% confidence interval 
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias 
 One-period ahead forward premium
Two monetary shocks. No persistency in both countries
Dashed lines are the bands for the 95% confidence interval 
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias 
 Two-periods ahead forward premium
Two monetary shocks. No persistency in both countries
Dashed lines are the bands for the 95% confidence interval 
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias 
One period ahead forward premium
Two monetary shocks. High persist. in the domestic country
Dashed lines are the bands for the 95% confidence interval 
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Median estimated slopes + asymptotic bias 
Two-periods ahead forward premium
Two monetary shocks. High persist. in the domestic country
Dashed lines are the bands for the 95% confidence interval 
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5 years rolling slopes and rolling correlation
Sample: January 1982 - December 2001
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Figure 21
Rolling slopes and persistence with 5 years moving window
Sample:  1982, January to December 2001
1 month time to maturity UK-USA forward
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